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Abstract
The measure dynamic approach to modelling singlespecies coevolution with a onedimensional
trait space is developed and compared to more traditional methods of adaptive dynam
ics and the Maximum Principle It is shown that among monomorphisms ie measures
supported on a single trait value the CSS Continuously Stable Strategy characterize
those that are Lyapunov stable and attract all initial measures supported in an interval
containing this trait value In the cases where adaptive dynamics predicts evolutionary
branching convergence to a dimorphism is established
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  Introduction
Interest in adaptive dynamics as a means to examine stability of coevolutionary systems
has grown exponentially over the past decade see Abrams   and the references
therein Cornerstones for this theory are the stability conditions eg continuously sta
ble strategy convergence stability developed for the mean strategy dynamic of a single
species with a onedimensional continuous trait space We briey summarize this approach
in Section   for the special case when individual tness is given by twovariable quadratic
functions dened on the trait space through pairwise interactions As coevolution also in
volves a density dynamic on the total population size we include a background tness that
is strategy independent and decreasing with respect to density to limit population growth
This has the eect that stability of the coevolutionary system is completely determined
by the strategy dynamic Here adaptive dynamics predicts stability of a monomorphic
equilibrium ie one where all individuals in the population are using the same strategy
if for all other monomorphisms that are small perturbations of this equilibrium trait
substitution through nearby mutations is only successful when this substitution moves the
population closer to the equilibrium
There is a general recognition among practitioners of adaptive dynamics eg Abrams
and Matsuda  that the assumptions underlying this approach eg maintenance of
monomorphisms through trait substitution and the suppression of population size eects
are questionable especially as the theory progresses to analyzing non equilibrium behavior
One alternative approach is to consider stability for only those coevolutionary systems
where the distribution of strategies has nite support ie there are only nitely many
dierent individual strategies used by the population during the course of evolution
probably close to the monomorphic equilibrium This approach which in some sense
ignores the possibility of continual though rare mutation is closely related to the Maximum
Principle promoted by Vincent and coworkers Cohen et al  Vincent et al 
 
as summarized in Section    We give reasons in Section  why we do not regard this as
an adequate replacement
It is always easier to criticize existing theories than to develop an alternative The
alternative we prefer is dynamic stability in the space of measures an extension of the
concepts developed for strategy distributions to models that include density dependence
Dynamics on strategy distributions and not just the mean with continuous strategy
 
The literature here calls this the ESS maximum Principle  As the term ESS has several possibly
dierent connotations we prefer to either drop this qualication altogether or to replace it with the more
neutral gametheoretic term of strict NE Nash equilibrium 

spaces have also been considered Bomze   Oechssler and Riedel     
where quadratic interaction terms are quite commonly used In contrast to adaptive
dynamics where monomorphic populations are invaded by rare mutants this literature
considers the evolution of distributions close to the monomorphic equilibrium distribution
For reasons discussed in Section 
 we consider this dynamic with the addition of
background tness to better model the coevolutionary process In Section  we generate
convergence and stability conditions for this measure dynamic in a general setting These
results give exact conditions in Section  with our assumption of quadratic pairwise inter
actions and background tness which are then compared to those of adaptive dynamics
and the Maximum Principle Section  extends these methods to other tness functions
on a onedimensional trait space Extensions to multidimensional trait space and to gen
eral tness functions are discussed in the nal section emphasizing the added analytic
problems that arise in these circumstances
 The Quadratic Pairwise Interaction Model
Suppose individuals in our single species use strategies that are parameterized by a single
real variable x belonging to a closed and bounded interval S    For tness associated
with quadratic pairwise interactions we take the payo of an individual using strategy x
against one using strategy y as
x y  ax

	 bxy 	 cy

	 dx	 ey 	 f
where x y   

Fitness of an individual using x is then the expected payo this
individual obtains in a random pairwise interaction with another individual in the pop
ulation

To avoid some mathematical complications we want tness to be positive for
all strategy pairs when the population size N is zero ie no Allee eect and also to be
negative when N is suciently large The simplest way to accomplish this mathemati
cally is to add an appropriate linear density term to the individual payo function that is
independent of the strategy pair ie a background tness term That is we take
x yN  ax

	 bxy 	 cy

	 dx	 ey 	 fN 
where fN is a linearly decreasing function of N so f is chosen to make x y  
for all x y    In the remainder of this section we briey describe the approaches of
adaptive dynamics Section   and the Maximum Principle Section    as they apply
to the stability analysis of momomorphic populations
  Adaptive Dynamics
The adaptive dynamics approach Hofbauer and Sigmund  to stability of a monomor
phism is based on a concept introduced by Eshel and coworkers eg Eshel 
 Eshel
et al  for models without density dependence that has come to be known as con 
vergence stable Christiansen  Taylor  A monomorphism x
 
is convergence
stable if every y suciently close but not equal to x
 
has a neighborhood Uy such
that the tness of any x  Uy when playing against y should be greater than that of y
against y if and only if x is closer to x
 
than y

Unless otherwise stated our variables x  y  x
 
etc are all assumed to belong to a closed and bounded
interval   

Population size is assumed su	ciently large that nite population eects such as those arising from
the fact an individual does not interact with himself can be ignored 
 
With density dependent adaptive dynamics Marrow et al  Dieckmann and Law
 these tnesses are calculated when population size is at its equilibrium value for
the monomorphism x We rst nd the equilibrium density Nx

 for x

 That is we
solve x

 x

 Nx

   for Nx

 to obtain
N x

  f
 
 
ax


	 bx


	 cx


	 dx

	 ex




We assume x
 
   ie in the interior of the trait space S So x
 
is convergence
stable if and only if there exists an    such that for all    jy x
 
j    there is a   
which is usually taken less than  and dependent on y such that
x yN y  y yN y    
if and only if    jx x
 
j   jy  x
 
j
The intuition here is that mutations from y will only be successful if they are closer
to the monomorphism thereby driving the population to x
 
 From   we consider the
dierence
x yNy y yNy
 ax

	 bxy 	 cy

	 dx	 ey 	 fNy
 
ay

	 by

	 cy

	 dy 	 ey 	 fNy

 ax

 y

 	 bx yy 	 d x y
 x ya x	 y 	 by 	 d
If  ax
 
	 bx
 
	 d   then x yN y  y yN y    if x
 
  x   y and y is
suciently close to x
 
so that a x	 y	by	d   That is x
 
is not convergence stable
By a similar argument with  ax
 
	 bx
 
	 d    we have that a necessary condition for x
 
to be convergence stable is
 ax
 
	 bx
 
	 d  
That is as a function of x Nx x
 
 Nx
 
 has a critical point when x  x
 

Furthermore if  a	 b   then d   and so
x yNy y yNy  x y ax	 y  ay  a x y


Thus  a 	 b   if x
 
is convergence stable This implies the dominating term in
x yN y y yN y is  a	 b x y y  x
 
 and so x
 
is convergence stable if
and only if
 ax
 
	 bx
 
	 d  
 a	 b   
These conditions for convergence stability can be rewritten in their more traditional
form eg Marrow et al  as
	
	x
x x
 
 Nx
 
j
xx
 
 
	

	x

x yNyj
xyx
 
	
	

	x	y
x yNyj
xyx
 
  
If there are non quadratic terms in x y then x
 
may be convergence stable even if the
last inequality is not strict in which case higher order terms need to be considered


Adaptive dynamics is concerned with the evolution of the mean strategy of the pop
ulation If the ecological time scale ie the time scale for changes in population size is
much faster than the evolutionary time scale on which the mean strategy evolves adap
tive dynamics eliminates the ecological eect by assuming the coevolutionary system tracks
equilibrium population size see also the discussion at the beginning of this section The
canonical equation for the mean strategy evolution near a monomorphic x
 
is then
dy
dt
 ky
	
	x
x yNyj
xy


where ky is a positive function that is related to the evolutionary time scale and to
equilibrium size For our quadratic payo model we have
dy
dt
 ky  ay 	 by 	 d 
ky a	 by  x
 
 We see y is asymptotically stable for the canonical equation if and
only if y  x
 
where x
 
is convergence stable
   The Maximum Principle
To simplify notation somewhat we can shift the monomorphism x
 

d
ab
to  and so
x
 
     by replacing x and y with x
d
ab
and y 
d
ab
respectively This has
the eect of eliminating the dx term in  so we now have

x yN  ax

	 bxy 	 cy

	 ey 	 fN
Vincent and coworkers see Cohen et al  and the references therein take a dif
ferent approach to model dynamic stability in coevolutionary systems Following Vincent
et al  the strategy x
 
  for them a coalition of one is evolutionarily stable for
the equilibrium size Nx
 
 if for all choices of nitely many mutant strategies fx

  x
r
g
the state Nx
 
    is asymptotically stable for the population dynamics
n
i
 n
i
F
i
n
 
  n
r
 
where n
i
is the size of that part of the population where individuals use strategy x
i
here
x
 
is identied with x
 
 and F
i
n
 
  n
r
 is the expected tness of strategy x
i
when the
population state is n
 
  n
r

When applied to our model with quadratic payo functions and random pairwise inter
actions that occur once per unit time for each individual these tnesses behave additively
to yield
F
i
n
 
  n
r
 
m
X
j 
n
j
x
i
 x
j
 N
N
where N 
P
n
j

To check stability the rdimensional system is linearized at Nx
 
    This has
the form of an upper triangular r r matrix with diagonal entries
Nx
 

	F
 
	n
 
 F

  F
r
where all these functions and partial derivatives are evaluated at Nx
 
    For
i   F
i
 x
i
 x
 
 Nx
 
  ax

i
and
 F
 
 n
 

x
 
x
 
N
 N
 f

Nx
 
    Thus x
 
  is
evolutionarily stable if a    and unstable if a  

This change of variables does shift e and fN by constants but these have no eect on the mathematical
anlysis 

Although the case a   is quite important since it forms the basis of models where
tness is linear in the individuals choice of strategy ie when x yN is linear in x
in our context we disregard this possibility as degenerate and so conclude that x
 
  is
evolutionarily stable
	
according to Vincent and coworkers if and only if
a   
The Maximum Principle is then equivalent to asserting that their tness generating
function x x
 
 Nx
 
 has a strict maximum at x  x
 
  as a function of x
This condition seems to have no immediate connection to that of convergence stability
However in the adaptive dynamics approach it is often assumed Marrow et al 
no mutant strategies x can invade x
 
ie none have higher tness than x
 
when the
population is monomorphic at x
 
 This is equivalent assuming a   to a    In fact
the condition a    was already assumed by Eshel 
 when he combined convergence
stability with it to dene a continuously stable strategy CSS x
 
to be one that satises
the two conditions a     a	 b   


On the other hand it should be noted that adaptive dynamics is also quite inter
ested in the convergence stable situation with a   since they view this as an instance
of sympatric speciation or evolutionary branching Doebeli and Dieckmann   Fur
thermore Vincent et al 
 see also Cohen et al  have developed a mean
strategy dynamic through their population dynamic model above that leads back to the
canonical equation Nevertheless it is clear that there are discrepancies between these
two approaches to modeling monomorphic stability in coevolutionary systems
 Measure Dynamic
The coevolutionary dynamic we consider is a generalization of the population dynamic 
to the space of distributions of the population over the continuous trait space S   
Specically let 
 be a nite measure dened on the algebra B of Borel subsets of S
When the population is in state 
 the measure 
B for any B  B is interpreted as the
number of individuals using strategies in B Then 
S is the total population size which
we assume to be positive The tness of an individual using strategy x  S this is also
denoted as the Dirac delta measure 
x
 is then its expected payo plus the background
tness namely
x 
 


S
Z
S
x y 
S
dy 
For our quadratic payo functions we obtain
x 
 


S
Z
S
ax

	 bxy 	 cy

	 ey
dy 	 f
S 
The measure dynamic becomes

As mentioned in the Introduction we prefer to designate this condition as stating x
 
is a strict NE 

This again requires quadratic tness functions or else higher order terms may need to be examined in
critical cases 

d

dt
B 
Z
B
x 

dx 
The rst question that arises is whether there are solutions to this dynamic There are
if 
 has nite support

at time  ie if 
 
P
r
i 
n
i

x
i
 Then 
S 
P
n
j
 N and
x
i
 
 
 
N
P
n
j
x
i
 x
j
 N The dynamics  is then the same as  in Section   
But we are more interested in the case where 
 does not have nite or discrete
support perhaps given through a continuous density function To show there are solutions
to  in the general case dene the measure P as
P B  
B
S
This is a probability measure ie P S   and we can rewrite individual tness of
strategy x  S as
x P 
S 
Z
S
ax

	 bxy 	 cy

	 eyP dy 	 f
S
and population mean tness as
P P 
S 
Z
S
x P 
SP dx	 f
S 
A straightforward calculation using the quotient rule from calculus implies the measure
dynamic for the probability space is
dP
dt
B 
Z
B
x P 
S P P 
SP dx 
Since x P 
SP P 
S does not depend on 
S we can ignore the background
tness f
S in  and take the tness function to have the form x y 
S  x y
Dynamics of the form  with x y  S  S  R continuous have been shown eg
Bomze  Oechssler and Riedel   to have solutions P
t
for all t   for any given
initial condition where the derivative on the lefthand side is taken with respect to the
variational norm
Furthermore evolution of the total population size satises
d
dt
S  
R
S
x P
t
 
SP
t
dx
S This is a onedimensional nonautonomous dy
namic with continuous vector eld and so has a unique solution for every initial condition
Also since x P
t
    and x P
t
 
S    for all P
t
if 
S is suciently large
the solution is bounded Moreover if P
t
evolves to P
 
 then 

t
converges to N
 
P
 
where
N
 
is the unique positive population size for which
R
S
x P
 
 N
 
P
 
dx   That is
for convergence and stability of the measure dynamic  we can restrict attention to
analyzing these same properties for  instead

The support supp  of a measure  is the closed set of those x for which every open neighbourhood of
x has positive measure 

 The Dynamic on the Space of Probability Measures
Our primary aim in the next section is the complete characterization of the convergence
and stability properties of the probability dynamic  for all quadratic payo functions
and S    However many of our results that lead to this characterization in Section
 are true for more general classes of payo functions and other trait spaces S These
general results are collected in the present section They rely on two Lyapunov functions
the relative or cross entropy and the mean payo that are developed in Sections  and
  respectively
For the sake of concreteness we assume S is a compact metric space and x y is a
continuous payo function on SS The measure dynamic is then the replicator equation
dP
dt
B 
Z
B
x P  P P P dx 
on the set of probability measures S on the Borel algebra This again has a unique
solution P
t
for all initial P

 S
An important issue is the topology to be used on S We feel the weak topology
captures best the essence of convergence in coevolutionary systems This topology will
mostly be applied to neighborhoods of monomorphic and dimorphic P
 
 For a probability
measure P
 
with nite support fx
 
     x
m
g we can take neighbourhoods in the weak
topology to be of the form
fQ  S  jQB

x
i
 P
 
x
i
j    i       mg
where B

x is the open ball of radius  centered at x In particular two monomorphisms

x
 
and 
x

are within  of each other if and only if the Euclidean distance between these
points is less than  In the following all topological notions are taken for this weak
topology unless otherwise stated
 Local Superiority
When S  fx
 
  x
m
g is nite the space of probability measures S is the set fq 
q
 
  q
m
j
P
m
j 
q
j
 g of probability vectors where q
i
is the proportion of the population
using the ith strategy The probability measure dynamic is then the standard replicator
game dynamic Hofbauer and Sigmund  with m m payo matrix whose entries
are x
i
 x
j
 A standard way to prove the local asymptotic stability of a strategy p
 
is
by showing that it is a matrixESS

ie that
p
 
 q  q q 
for all q close to p
 
 Here closeness is meant either on each ray connecting p
 
with another
strategy p or simply in a Euclidean neighborhood Whereas these various versions of
closeness are all equivalent in nite games there are many dierent versions for games
with an innite trait space S see also the Remark in Section  The weaker the
topology or more general nearness concept on S the stronger the corresponding
version of ESS Although it is our contention that the generalization of  to innite

As mentioned earlier the term ESS is overused in the literature and so may have several meanings
for some readers  On the other hand for games with a nite trait space there is one universally accepted
meaning originating with Maynard Smith 
 as an evolutionarily stable strategy of the m  m payo
matrix A hence a matrixESS 

trait spaces with respect to the weak topology deserves the ESS designation we have used
the phrase locally superior in the weak topology instead for this concept in the following
denition to avoid confusion Also the notion of local superiority Weibull  is now
wellestablished for the case of a nite trait space S as an alternative phrase to denote a
matrixESS

De
nition   P
 
 S is a locally superior strategy in the weak topology if for all
Q  P
 
suciently close to P
 

P
 
 Q  QQ  
We say P
 
is globally superior if this inequality is true for all Q  P
 

Our rst main result given in the following theorem uses the concept of cross entropy
 
as developed by Bomze  for probability measure dynamics If P is absolutely con
tinuous with respect to Q and whose RadonNikodym derivative  
dP
dQ
is bounded ie
there is a C   such that P A   CQA for all Borel sets A  S then the cross entropy
LQ  K
QP

Z
S
log
dP
dQ
P dx 
Z
S
 logQdx
is dened nonnegative and nite Lemma   in Bomze  shows that LQ
t
 is dened
along the orbit of Q and its time derivative satises
d
dt
LQ
t
  PQ
t
 	 Q
t
 Q
t
 

for all t   In particular the cross entropy is decreasing if P is locally superior and Q
t
is suciently close to P  a key fact in the proof of the following theorem
Theorem  If P
 
is a locally superior strategy which is Lyapunov stable then for any
initial Q suciently close to P
 
with suppQ 	 suppP
 
 Q
t
 P
 
as t 	
 Moreover
if P
 
is globally superior and Lyapunov stable then for any initial Q  S with suppQ 	
supp P
 
 Q
t
 P
 
as t 	

Proof Let U
 
be a compact neighborhood of P
 
such that P
 
 P   P P   
holds for all P  U
 
n fP
 
g Since P
 
is Lyapunov stable there is a neighborhood U

of
P
 
such that for all Q  U

and t   we have Q
t
 U
 

Suppose now that P
 
is not an limit point of such a Q Then there is an open
neighborhood U

of P
 
with Q
t
 U

for all t   By compactness P
 
 P  P P  
 c   for some c   and all P  U
 
nU

 By continuity for all

P close enough to P
 
in
the weak topology we have


P P  P P   c   P  U
 
nU

 
Since suppP
 
  suppQ there is such a

P which is absolutely continuous with respect
to Q and whose RadonNikodym derivative
d

P
dQ
is bounded
  
By 
 and  the cross

In Oechssler and Riedel  locally superior with respect to the weak topology is called evolu
tionarily robust 
 	
In the nite case this cross entropy corresponds to the function Lq 
P
i
p
 
i
log
p
 
i
q
i
which like
Q
i
q
p
 
i
i
is the wellknown Lyapunov function near a matrixESS p
 
 
  
Such a

P exists since the weak closure of the set of probability measures that are absolutely continuous
with respect to Q and have bounded RadonNikodym derivative is the set of all probability measures whose
support is contained in suppQ For example for s  suppQ and U
n
the
 
n
neighborhood of s the measures
with density
 
Q
U
n


U
n
converge to 
s


entropy LQ  K
Q

P
is dened and satises
d
dt
LQ
t
   c   
along the solution Q
t
for t   Hence LQ
t
 
 a contradiction to LQ  
This shows that P
 
is an limit point of Q Since P
 
is Lyapunov stable it is the
unique limit point of Q and hence Q
t
 P
 
 Finally if P
 
is globally superior then
take U
 
 U

 S This completes the proof
This result generalizes Theorem 
 of Oechssler and Riedel    who proved it for
monomorphisms P
 
 
x
 
and initial Q with Qfx
 
g   in place of our weaker assump
tion x
 
 suppQ It is an open problem whether the additional assumption of Lyapunov
stability is really needed When the trait space is nite Lyapunov stability follows from
local superiority
It is essential suppQ 	 suppP
 
for the conclusions given in Theorem   to be valid
This is due to the fact that the measure dynamic  shares the same property as  in
that its support is invariant for all t  
 
However local asymptotic stability of x
 
in
the dynamic  does not imply the corresponding discrete measure converges weakly to

x
 
since this would require  to be globally asymptotically stable for all nite choices
of strategies that are suciently close to x
 

Remark The following observations are useful to identify locallyglobally superior
strategies First every locally superior strategy P
 
is a Nash equilibrium NE ie
P
 
 P
 
  QP
 
 for all Q  S Indeed given Q  S for all  suciently
close to zero
   P
 
 P
 
	 Q P
 
 P
 
	 Q P
 
 P
 
	 Q P
 

 P
 
QP
 
	 Q P
 

Thus for   we get    P
 
QP
 

Second if the game is negative denite ie P  QP  Q    for all Q  P 
then there exists a globally superior strategy To see this let P
 
be any NE Then for all
Q  P
 
P
 
 Q QQ  P
 
QP
 
 	 P
 
 QQ P
 

 P
 
QQ P
 
  
Conversely if P
 
is locally superior on each ray connecting P
 
with another strategy Q
with full support then the game is negative denite
 
  Potential Games
Consider now a symmetric payo function   S  S ie x y  y x that is
assumed to be continuous Note that for quadratic tness functions and S    the
dynamic  is unchanged if we take the symmetric version x y  ax

	 bxy 	 ay

as our payo function By common gametheoretic usage games with symmetric payo
matrices are known as potential games
 
In fact Q
	
and Q
t
are mutually absolutely continuous measures as shown by Bomze 

 
 
If P
 
is globally superior but does not have full support then the game is not necessarily negative
denite as already games with two strategies show  A game is negative denite if and only if the mean
payo function P  P P  is strictly concave on   Our quadratic games are negative semidenite if
and only if b   

By the symmetry of  the expected payo satises
d
dt
P P    
Z
S
Z
S
x yxP  P P P dxP dy
  
Z
S
x P  P P 

P dx   
By the continuity of x P  in x there is equality if and only if x P   P P  for
all x in the support of P if and only if P is a rest point of 
 
Thus P P  is a
strict Lyapunov function on S in that it is strictly increasing under  unless at
equilibrium
Since S is compact in the weak topology and P P  is a continuous function P
 
will be Lyapunov stable if it is an isolated local maximizer of P P  with respect to the
weak topology For nite games a strategy P
 
is a local maximizer of P P  if and
only if it is locally superior see eg Hofbauer and Sigmund  In general only the
following direction is true as shown by the counterexample given in Remark of Section

Lemma  If P
 
is locally superior then it is an isolated local maximizer of the mean
tness function P P 
Proof Since P
 
is a Nash equilibrium P
 
 P
 
  QP
 
  P
 
 Q  QQ
for all Q suciently close to P
 

Combining the above with Theorem   we get
Theorem  If P
 
is a locally superior strategy with respect to the weak topology in a
potential game then P
 
is Lyapunov stable and for any initial Q suciently close to P
 
with suppQ 	 supp P
 
 Q
t
 P
 
 If P
 
is globally superior with suppQ 	 supp P
 
 then
Q
t
 P
 

This theorem was proved by Bomze  in the special case where x y depends
only on x and by Oechssler and Riedel    when x y is symmetric and P
 
is a
monomorphism
 Dynamic Stability for Quadratic Payo Functions
Let us apply the general theory above to our quadratic payo function x y  ax

	
bxy 	 ay

where the interesting monomorphism is x
 
  and we assume a   For
this the following formulas for PQ etc in terms of the mean EP  and the variance
V arP  of a probability measure P are useful It is even convenient to consider higher
order moments let P
k

R
x
k
P dx be the kth moment of P  Then P
 
 EP  and
P

 V arP  	 P

 
 We get x P   ax

	 bxP
 
	 aP


PQ  aP

	 bP
 
Q
 
	 aQ


 aV arP  	EP 

	 V arQ 	 EQ

 	 bEP EQ 
P P    aV arP  	  a	 bEP 

 
x P  P P   ax

 P

 	 bxP
 
 P

 
 
P QP Q  bEP EQ

 
 
This is the extension to continuous strategy spaces of one part of the Fundamental Theorem of Natural
Selection that states mean tness increases unless at equilibrium 

Our classication of the stability of 

in Sections  and   is based rst on whether
a is negative or positive and then on subclasses depending on the value of b This classi
cation scheme is similar to that given by Geritz et al  and Diekmann    for
the adaptive dynamics approach
One reason for using this classication scheme is that the subspace of probability
measures that are symmetric about  is invariant for our quadratic payo functions and
on this subspace the variance is increasing if a   and decreasing if a    To see this
we derive from  and

P
k

Z
x
k
d

P 
Z
x
k
x P  P P P dx
the dierential equations for the moments

P
 
 aP

	 b aP
 
P

 bP

 
 

P

 aP

 aP


	 bP
 
P

 bP

 
P

 

P

 aP
	
 aP

P

	 bP
 
P

 bP

 
P

  
  
Obviously if the initial P is symmetric around  then so is P
t
 hence the odd moments
vanish and the variance satises

P

 aP

 P


 Since P

 P


with equality for point
measures variance increases if a   and decreases if a    In particular this shows
instability of 

for a  
 Case  a    
This is the case where x
 
  is a strict NE ie   x  for all x  
   Case  a a	 b   
From  we see that P P     with equality if and only if P  P
 
 

 Thus P
 
is the unique global maximizer of the mean tness function and there are no other local
maximizers Hence P
 
 

is Lyapunov stable by section   Furthermore from 
if Q  P
 
 then


 Q QQ  aV arQ a	 bEQ

 
Thus P
 
 

is globally superior and by Theorem   it attracts all initial Q

that have
  suppQ


  Case  b  a	 b      a	 b
We still have P
 
 

as the unique global maximizer of mean tness and so Lyapunov
stable but it is no longer locally superior However the following theorem that uses an
iterated domination argument between pure strategies shows P
 
still attracts all initial
Q

with full support
Theorem  Suppose a    and a 	  b      a 	 b If the support of Q

is an interval
that contains x
 
  then Q
t
converges to 

in the weak topology

Proof Without loss of generality assume suppQ 	   Let x

 
b
a
 Then
   x

   Take A  x

	 
  and B  x

	  x

	   where x

	 
    and  is
positive
Then another application of the quotient rule yields
d
dt

QB
QA



QA

Z
S


Z
A
Z
B
x z y zQdxQdy


Qdz  

For x  B y  A z  S we have
x z y z  ax

	 bxz  ay

 byz  x yax	 y 	 bz   a

   
Thus
d
dt

QB
QA
  
QB
QA
 a

  Thus
d
dt

QB
QA
 grows to innity with exponential order
In particular limQ
t
A is  as t approaches innity Now choose  so that x

	 
 
x

	   ie     x

 Then limQ
t
x

	    is  Now suppose we have
shown limQ
t
    for some        We will iterate the above argument to show
limQ
t

x
	


    Take A   a 	 
  and B   a	  a 	  
where  a	 
    Then
d
dt

QB
QA



QA

Z


Z
A
Z
B
x z y zQdxQdyQdz
	

QA

Z
S

Z
A
Z
B
x z y zQdxQdyQdz
 Q  K	QS    a


QB
QA
 a

QB
QA
for t suciently large Here K  max
xyS
jx yj In particular limQ
t
A   Thus
by iteration we can take   x

	  
n
 for all n  Z and so limQ
t
    for all
  
A similar argument on the interval   with     completes the proof
In gametheoretic terms inequality   asserts that every x  B strictly dominates ev
ery y  A The proof is then essentially the iterated elimination of strictly dominated pure
strategies This technique is wellknown for games with nite trait space eg Samuelson
and Zhang   Hofbauer and Weibull  but this seems to be the rst instance
where it is used in games with a continuum of pure strategies
The method of proof can extend the statement of the Theorem to measures that do
not have full support as long as the gap between points in the support of Q

is not
too great This gap must decrease as we get closer to x
 
 In particular if one wants to
approximate the measure dynamic with a discrete version similar to  then one needs
the grid to become ner as we approach x
 
 Otherwise say if the grid is uniform the
most we can expect is that the support of Q
t
will approach an interval containing x
 
and
that this interval will approach x
 
as the number of points in the grid increases
 
  Case  c  a	 b  
P P    for all P  
x
with x    In this degenerate case the payo function
x y  ax  y

is translation invariant Every 
s
is a strict NE and maximizer of
P P 
  Case  d  a	 b  
Here P  

is a saddle point and P  

and P  

are the only local maximizers of
P P  These endpoints are also locally superior with respect to those Q whose support
is either  or   respectively This gives us a bistable situation where some initial
Q

close to 

evolve to one monomorphism supported at one endpoint and some to the
other In fact by continuity of QQ 

attracts those Q

with full support that have
Q

  suciently small
Remark The four subcases of this section clarify the relevance of the CSS concept
and the importance of the topology chosen for S
First Cases a and b combine to show that a CSS x
 
  in the interior of   ie
a    and  a	 b    is Lyapunov stable and every initial Q with full support converges
to 

in the weak topology Moreover it is already clear from  that 

is unstable if
 a	 b   These results give a strong measure theoretic justication of the CSS concept
that lies at the heart of adaptive dynamics
It must be pointed out however that there is a signicant dierence between the
basins of attraction of 

that are CSS depending on the sign of a 	 b If a 	 b    

is known as a good invader Kisdi and Mesz ena  or a neighborhood invader strategy
NIS McKelvey and Apaloo  Apaloo  This latter condition can be used to
prove convergence in Case a with a single domination argument Cressman  
 that
avoids the entropy technique used in the proof of Theorem   To illustrate this dierence
suppose Q

is a dimorphism with support f sg with    s    Then a	 b    implies
Q
t
converges to 

in the weak topology
On the other hand if a 	 b   the dynamic  restricted to the support f sg is
bistable with q  Q
t
fg and  q  Q
t
fsg we get
q  q qq  s 	  q s s s
 q qs

bq  a	 b  
Hence q    if    q   a 	 bb Note that    a 	 bb     which means that 

has the larger basin of attraction on this line than 
s
 Thus q   if q is suciently
small initially This result also follows from  since q

	  q
s
 q

	  q
s
 
s

bq

 a	bq	 a	b which is a quadratic function of q with minimum at q  a	bb
Since QQ is increasing Q
t
 
s
if    Q

fg   a	bb Furthermore by continuity
of QQ in the weak topology for  suciently small if suppQ

   s  s	 
and Q

s   s 	    a 	 bb then Q
t
s   s 	    as t  
 actually Q
t
converges weakly to 
s
by the argument in the proof of Theorem 
The above analysis also shows that the convergence results of Theorem  need not be
true if we only assume P
 
is the unique global maximizer of the expected payo P P 
Cases c and d illustrate the importance of the chosen topology for convergence and
stability results Speccly 

is locally superior with respect to the variational norm
 	
if
 
This norm corresponds to the strong topology with respect to which local superiority is often called
strongly uninvadable e g  Bomze 

 


and only if a    That is even in these last two cases when mean tness at 

is less
than that of any other monomorphism 

is locally superior in the strong topology in
fact every 
s
in Case c is locally superior Thus 

is Lyapunov stable in this strong
topology and further Q
t
converges weakly to 

 if Q

fg is close to  as shown by
Oechssler and Riedel 
  Case   a   
From  any local maximizer of P P  must have as large a variance as possible given
EP
 
  E Thus the support of P
 
is contained in f g In fact P
 
E
 p
 
 


	 p
 



where p
 
 

E

and p
 


E

 Thus we need to maximize
fE  VarP
 
E
   ap
 
 
E  

	 p
 

E  

 	  a	 bE

for E    This expression simplies to
fE   aE  E   	  a	 bE

 bE

	  a	 E   a
If b    this is a downwards parabola that has a unique maximum at E
 
 
a
b
	
Depending on whether E
 
is outside or inside the interval S the unique local maximizer
is given by P
 
 

if a	 b	a   by P
 
 

if a	 b	a    and by the above
dimorphism if a	 b 	 a    and a	 b	 a   Since P
 
is a NE and the game
is negative semidenite by 
P
 
 Q QQ  P
 
QP
 
 	 P
 
QQ P
 

 P
 
QQ P
 
  bEP
 
EQ

 
Furthermore if EP
 
  EQ then P
 
 Q  QQ  aV arP
 
  V arQ from
 and  Thus P
 
 Q QQ   unless P
 
and Q have the same mean and
variance Since P
 
is the unique probability measure that has the largest variance for a
given mean P
 
is globally superior By Theorem  P
 
is Lyapunov stable and attracts
every Q

whose support contains that of P
 

  Case a  a	 b   
In this case we have the situation which is often referred to in the adaptive dynamics
literature as evolutionary branching Geritz et al  It is straightforward to show
that P
 
is then a dimorphism By the above reasoning for b    P
 
is Lyapunov stable
and attracts any initial Q whose support includes f g since it is globally superior
 Case b  a	 b   and b   
P
 
is still globally superior but could be either a dimorphism or one of the monomorphisms


or 


 Case c b  
In this nal case fE is an upwards parabola which has 

and 

as the local maximizers
of P P  This is again the bistable situation as in Case d

 Normal Distributions with S  R
Following Oechssler and Riedel    we consider special solutions Q
t
of  with S  R
that are normal distributions with mean mt and variance V t ie
dQ
t
dx


p
 V t
e


xm
t

V 
t
 
From
d

P
dP
x  x P  P P  we obtain

d
dt

xmt

 V t
	

 
log V t
	
 ax

mt

 	 bmtxmt aV t
which reduces to

V   aV

m   a	 bmV  
Hence   are solutions of  if and only if the mean and variance satisfy the dierential
equations  
This illustrates nicely the meaning of the two crucial parameters a and  a 	 b the
equation for the mean resembles the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics Note that
for a   the variance goes to innity in nite time Such a blow up is possible only for
non!compact S
 NonQuadratic Payo Functions
The method developed in Section  and the proof of Theorem  can be used to analyze
probability measure dynamics beyond the quadratic payo functions considered in Section
 For instance the domination argument used in the proof of Theorem  remains valid if
we restrict the support of Q

to be an interval suciently close to x
 
so that the quadratic
terms in the Taylor expansion of x y about x
 
 x
 
 are predominant In particular a
CSS that is not an NIS continues to attract all such initial Q

 Moreover the onetime
domination argument of Cressman  
 see Remark in Section  shows the same
result for arbitrary support suciently close to x
 
when x
 
is CSS and NIS Thus the
CSS condition will continue to guarantee local convergence in the absence of the symmetry
implied by only quadratic terms in the payo function  what is lost is whether the CSS
remains Lyapunov stable Conversely if x
 
is not CSS then a reverse domination argument
shows instability of 
x
 

In the other case of particular interest to adaptive dynamics ie the evolutionary
branching of Case  a a convergence stable x
 
with 
xx
x
 
 x
 
   will be unstable in
the measure dynamic whether x y is quadratic or not What is not so clear is what
the measure dynamic will evolve to in this situation without the quadratic payos that
imply a globally stable dimorphism emerges that is supported on the endpoints of the
trait space S since mean tness grows as variance increases However our results apply
to nonquadratic payo functions of the form x y  x 	 bxy 	 y with b    and
 an arbitrary smooth function Since such games are negative semidenite if there is a
unique maximizer P
 
of the mean tness then P
 
is globally superior and hence attracts
all initial Q with full support If 
xx
   then there is no monomorphic NE and hence
P
 
is supported on at least two traits As an example take b   and x   x

 x

on the trait space S  R If suppQ

contains both maxima of  ie f g the theory

from Section  proves Q
t
converges to the Lyapunov stable dimorphism P
 

 


 
	
 


 
in the weak topology This follows from the fact P
 
is globally superior since
P
 
 Q QQ 

Z
S
Z
S
x xy 	 yP
 
dxQdy
Z
S
Z
S
x xy 	 yQdxQdy


 
	  	
Z
S
yQdy  
Z
S
yQdyEQ

  
unless suppQ  f g and EQ   ie unless Q  P
 

 Discussion
This paper is meant to introduce measure dynamics as a means to model coevolutionary
systems and to compare this theory to other more established approaches such as adaptive
dynamics The comparison is most complete in the basic model of coevolution where
stability of a monomorphism in a single species with a onedimensional continuous trait
space is analyzed This necessarily entailed several simplifying assumptions that we would
like to address in this concluding section
We have already discussed to some extent the issue of symmetric payo functions
in Section  There is no doubt symmetry is an important tool in our development of
the theory for a general setting in Section  see especially Lemma 
 and its proof that
shows a locally superior strategy is Lyapunov stable On the other hand the quadratic
approximation to tness functions about a monomorphism x
 
provide this symmetry and
can be used to describe local behavior of the dynamics of probability measures with support
near x
 

Dependence on total population size ie density dependence is included in our model
by assuming a background tness that is strategy independent This has the eect that
density dependence essentially disappears from the measure space dynamic of Section 

as well as the adaptive models summarized in Section   General density dependence
is more dicult from a technical perspective One attempt to avoid this problem is to
assume as in the adaptive dynamics approach that the population instantaneously tracks
its equilibrium density for a given probability measure This assumption is usually jus
tied by appealing to a dichotomy between the time scales for the population dynamics
ecological time scale versus strategy evolution evolutionary time scale That is it
is assumed ecological changes are much faster than evolutionary ones The dynamic is
then reduced to one on the stationary density surface SDS where the tness x P 
is assumed to be given by x PNP  where NP  is on the stationary density sur
face We feel such an assumption is unwarranted if adaptive dynamics is to be put on
rm theoretical ground However there is some evidence the SDS continues to play an
important role when there is no separation of time scales at least when there is a nite
number of strategies as in Section    The SDS can then be used to separate the density
eect from the local asymptotic stability analysis of the mean strategy dynamic for both
monomorphisms and polymorphisms in single species Cressman   or multiple species
Cressman and Garay  
 models of coevolution Of particular relevance for us is the
result for monomorphisms namely a monomorphism is locally asymptotically stable in
the coevolutionary model of combined density and strategy evolution when there is a nite
number of strategies if and only if the monomorphic density dynamic is asymptotically
stable at equilibrium strategy and the induced strategy dynamic on the stationary density

surface is asymptotically stable no matter what the relative rates of ecology and evolution
are For our measure dynamic models we conjecture a stationary density surface will
continue to predict local behavior near a monomorphism but not for general equilibria P
 
distributed over the trait space see also our comments on higher dimensional trait space
below
Mutation has not been explicitly added to our model since our perspective is that this
eect is already included by considering arbitrary initial population distributions over the
strategy space In this sense all potential mutations are already present in the system to
start with and if this mutation is successful it will grow in relative size compared to
other possible strategies In particular our formalism includes systems that are initially
concentrated near a monomorphic equilibrium with a small subpopulation concentrated
around a mutant strategy On the other hand our results also allow one to introduce
rare mutations in the more traditional sense by letting the system evolve arbitrarily close to
a stable equilibrium between mutation events Theorems   and  then show the perturbed
system will stay close to a locally superior equilibrium distribution P
 
that is Lyapunov
stable and eventually return to it
The adaptive dynamics approach has also been extended to multidimensional strategy
spaces eg Mesz ena et al   andor multispecies models eg Marrow et al 
For a singlespecies monomorphic equilibrium x
 
in a compact trait space in R
n
such as
a ball or hypercube the measure dynamic approach applied here suggests the method of
assuming the CSS conditions hold along any ray as in Mesz ena et al   from x
 
is
particularly relevant Indeed it is straightforward to see that the CSS conditions along any
ray are necessary for stability of 

simply take initial measures supported on this ray
On the other hand under the additional condition corresponding to NIS convergence to
x
 
can be shown in the weak topology when initial distributions have support suciently
close to x
 
this uses an argument similar to Cressman  
 A precise characterization
of stability is an open problem
However in other multidimensional or multispecies situations eg nonmonomorphic
P
 
or especially if there is nonequilibrium behavior of the adaptive dynamics such as cyclic
behavior in a singlespecies model or in a twospecies predatorprey system we are quite
skeptical that the conclusions from the measure dynamic approach will correspond to that
from adaptive dynamics where it is again assumed population sizes tracks its equilibrium
value There is in fact evidence from coevolutionary models based on nite trait spaces
eg Abrams and Matsuda  that questions the relevance of the adaptive dynamics
approach in these circumstances Models that exhibit nonequilibrium behavior also call
into question the assumption that tness functions are based on pairwise interactions It
seems more reasonable that in such situations x 
 should depend on the measure in a
more complicated way than simply averaging the payos between individual interactions
In fact such nonpairwise tness functions were proposed from the outset of coevolutionary
models eg Roughgarden  where LotkaVolterra type models were proposed with
interaction coecients given by Gaussian distributions depending on the separation of
strategies from the mean
We view this paper as a rst but crucial step to give the adaptive dynamics approach
a solid theoretical foundation as a means to predict long term behavior in coevolutionary
systems From this perspective our results see especially the Remark in Section  that
the CSS plays a central role in understanding convergence and stability of the measure
dynamic at a monomorphism shows the adaptive method is clearly a valid shortcut to
analyzing coevolutionary models when there are quadratic pairwise interactions As dis
cussed above there are many obstacles to a general theory but the end results should be
equally rewarding

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